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Volume 39 Winter 1974 Number 1
JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE BROWN DECISION:
A SPECULATIVE INQUIRY*
Glmwrm T. DuNNE**
"Yes, the unanimity of the Court in the Segregation decisions
rightly gave the widest comfort.... Maybe one of these days the
story will be known how it came to pass."'
I. Tm AmuCAN DnMM
A. The New Chief Justice
"I made straitway for the chambers of Mr. Justice Black.. ." recalled
Earl Warren concerning journey's end to the abrupt five-day transition from
the governorship of California to the Chief Justiceship of the United States.
"He welcomed me to the Court and offered his assistance in every possible
way. He then took me to the chambers of the other members of the Court
who were also most cordial in their welcome."2 By the time the round of
introductions was over, it was almost noon and time for senior Associate
Justice Black to administer the constitutional oath to his new chief in the
customary private ceremony in the conference room. The members of the
Court then filed into the courtroom itself where Warren again was sworn,
this time to the judicial oath and once more at Black's hands.
*This article was prepared by Professor Dunne as a chapter for HuGo BLAcK
AND THE JUDIcrAL REVOL~UTON which is scheduled for publication this year by
Simon and Schuster.
"Professor of Law, St. Louis University; B.S.B.A. Georgetown University,
1948; LL.B. St. Louis University, 1948.
1. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to C.C. Burlingham, May 28, 1954, in
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter Papers].
Until that story is definitely told, perhaps in memoirs yet to be published, all
accounts of the Brown decision must be in great measure suppositious. Certainly
this one is, even though, in the interest of brevity, the indicative mood has been
used throughout and qualifiers of caution--"alleged," "indicates," etc.-largely
omitted. The author is grateful for the published work and private counsel of
Professor S. Sidney Ulmer of the University of Kentucky and other obligations
noted in the footnotes. (Reliance was also placed on C. HARBAUGH, L wYEn's
LmwYE 483-585 (1973).) Any errors, misjudgments and omissions, however, are
the author's alone.
2. J. WEAVER, WArREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 198-99 (1967).
(1)
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The day was October 5, 1953, as good as any to mark the onset of the
great judicial revolution, although then little radicalism seemed suggested
in the man whose name the revolutionary tribunal was to bear. Yet Warrens
very entry onto the judicial scene was portentous: the new Chief Justice
took his seat under recess appointment and without Senate confirmation as
Dwight Eisenhower did what Franklin Roosevelt had dared only to threaten
-forego advanced advice and consent and confront the returning Senate
with the fait accompli of a sitting Justice engrossed in the work of the Court.
As things were to turn out, Warrens exit would be on an equally unprece-
dented and provisional note-retirement subject to the appointment and
qualification of a successor.
Beneath the seemingly uncomplicated and almost glacial calm exuded
by the new Chief Justice lay an extraordinary combination of complexity
and will galvanized by an abounding energy. And to this was to be coupled
an intense sensitivity to the prestige of his Court and a profound sense of
identification with it. Indeed, his initial astonishment at the small staff of
the high judicial office-a secretary, a messenger, a brace of law clerks-
compared with the two hundred aides who had done his bidding as Gov-
ernor of California presaged something of that sensitivity and identification.
On October 5, 1953, however, the new Chief Justice's judicial attitudes
and philosophy were just another of the unknowns in the towering issue
facing the Court he had been called to head-the constitutionality of the
"separate-but-equal" doctrine in public education. The preceding December
there had been one inconclusive pass at arms before the Court in the first
fundamental re-examination of the question in over half a century. A decade
before, however, the issue had been both appropriately titled and massively
analyzed in An American Dilemma, by Gunnar Myrdal, a member of the
Swedish Academy and perhaps the world's foremost social scientist. A
decade later a distinguished literary magazine would list the book as the
second most important work to appear during its own institutional existence.3
(First was Lord Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money, and third was Hitler's Mein Kampf.) And in an arresting example of
the interplay of the world of ideas and the world of reality, it was, unques-
tionably Warrens citation of the work in Brown, the landmark opinion of
his revolutionary Court, that brought about the commerative acknowledg-
ment in the journal of literary criticism.
The book's title summed up the contradiction between the American
ideal and American practice; its theme focused on a critical pressure point
of that contradiction-the legal infrastructure in the southern and border
states "separating the two groups in schools, on railroad cars and on street
cars, in hotels and restaurants, in parks and playgrounds, in theaters and
public meeting places . . . with the explicit purpose of diminishing, as
8. SATtrmAy RlEvmw, Aug. 29, 1964, at 74.
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far as was practicable and possible, the social contacts between whites
and Negroes.... .4
Remarkably enough, Myrdal had had a personal encounter with the
operation of such separate-but-equal legislation; perhaps it underlay in part
his observation that "by traveling around the country, in particular in the
South, to see things with my own eyes, I was shocked and scared to the
bones by all the evils I saw."5 He was present in Birmingham at the first
meeting of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare when Police Com-
missioner Theophilus Eugene ("Bull") Connor-later world famous for his
pronouncement, "We're not going to have white folks and nigras segre-
gating together in this man's town" 6 -imposed the local segregation ordi-
nance upon the gathering. Myrdal made no reference to the incident in the
book nor did he mention the newly-appointed Justi6e Black's speech before
the conference accepting its first Thomas Jefferson award.7 He did, however,
single out Black as one of the most prominent Southern liberals and noted
that it seemed "easier for a Southern liberal to win a seat in Congress than
to be really influential at home."
B. The Senior Associate
Black's political career strikingly epitomized Myrdal's epigram. Para-
doxically, Black could filibuster against an anti-lynching bill as an uncon-
stitutional extension of federal police power and in the very act extol
the plenary reach of the commerce clause. ("[Elconomically, in trade and
commerce, this Nation is one, indivisible and inseparable . .. .")9 Alone
of all the Senators, he could denounce Herbert Hoover's use of force to oust
from Washington the protesting veterans of the Bonus Army, and, at the
same time, tell some Vassar-Wellesley protesters against the Scottsboro10 case
to give their sympathies to crime in the northern cities. As Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor he could extol the great trans-
forming power of education while declining to give the minority school
systems any legal assurance of a pro rata share of federal assistance.
And yet a fellow American, in an infinitely better position to perceive
and, indeed, to regret the paradox than Gunnar Myrdal ever was, struck
the balance on Black and found it good. "[HI]e seemed to me,' recollected
Walter White, then Executive Secretary of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, "to be the advance guard of the new
4. 0. MYRDA, AN AmmucAN DmEM A 579 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
MYnRDL]. Except as indicated in the following footnote, the citation is to the
original edition.
5. G. Mm'DA, AN AmmmcAN DILEMMA xxv (Anniversary Ed. 1962).
6. C. MORGAN, A TIm To SPEAK 48 (1964).
7. See T. KRuEGER, ANm PRomnsEs TO KEEP 28 (1967); N.Y. Times, Nov.
24, 1988, at 83; Id. Nov. 11, 1938, at 19.
8. MmYRDr at 469.
9. 79 CONG. REc. 6533 (1935).
10. See Patterson v. State, 234 Ala. 342, 175 So. 371, cert. denied, 802
U.S. 733 (1937) (change of venue); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)(jury discrimination); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel).
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South we dreamed of and hoped for ... ."1 The evening of Black's nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court saw a remarkable and earnest colloquy, as the
head of the nation's then most militant civil rights organization warned the
senior Senator from Alabama of "being on the spot" when any issue involving
a minority came before the Supreme Court. "He told me frankly and
soberly," White wrote a friend, "that he realized this and that he hoped
he would be able to measure up to what I and others of his friends
expected of him."12
Black did measure up, although the start was faltering. He disqualified
himself in the third Scottsboro3 case at about the time his Senate successor
involved him in another filibuster against anti-lynching by reading his
earlier speech into the Congressional Record. In fact, during that debate,
Senator Tom Connally of Texas brandished a copy of the bill and warned
his colleagues that there was a man on the Supreme Court who was pre-
pared to hold it unconstitutional. But on Lincoln's birthday of 1940 Black
cleared up all doubts as he spoke for a unanimous court in Chambers v.
Florida,14 striking down a Florida death sentence imposed on four black
tenant farmers accused of murder: "Under our constitutional system, courts
stand against winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because
they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement." 5
Chambers was a difficult opinion for Black. The case involved going
against two principles he held particularly dear. One was overturning a
jury verdict; in Chambers the jury had found that confessions produced
by nightlong interrogation incommunicado were nonetheless voluntary.
Another, strongly underscored in his anti-lynching filibuster, was an antip-
athy for using the 14th amendment as a vehicle for federal interference
with state judicial process. Indeed, Black had voted against taking Chambers
11. W. WHrr., A MAN CALLED WmTIr 177 (1948). In the only interview
given by Black in the interval between the disclosure of his Klan membership and
his famous radio address he observed "that the secretary of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People .. .had commended his appoint-
ment." Baltimore Sun, Sept. 16, 1937, at _ . Under intense pressure, White
stuck by his guns when swamped by newspapers for counter-comment: "It
seemed wisest to answer briefly that my firsthand acquaintance... convinced me
that Mr. Black would prove to be one of the most valued and able members of
the Court." W. WmvrE, supra at 179.
White never wavered, then or later, in his estimate of Black's integrity
and high sense of purpose, even when subsequent years brought occasional Black
opinions with which he profoundly disagreed. (Interview with Mr. Roy Wilkins,
Executive Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
in flight between New York and St. Louis, April 17, 1971. Mr. Wilkins, obviously
relieved to have a few hours to read a novel (THE StumNMsR OF '42), graciously
put aside his book to talk to the author.)
12. Letter from Walter White to Max Lowenthal, Aug. 20, 1937, Copy in
Frankfurter Papers.
13. Patterson v. State, 284 Ala. 842, 175 So. 371, cert. denied, 802 U.S. 738
(1987).
14. 809 U.S. 227 (1940).
15. Id. at 241.
[Vol. 39
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/10
1974] JUSTICE BLACK AND THE BROWN DECISION 5
in the first place, and the assignment to write the opinion placed him in the
sharpest of dilemmas. "But the evidence of oppression and injustice would
not down. The opinion Black wrote, after great internal struggles, was a
turning point... [foreshadowing] much of what was to become his mature
[judicial] philosophy."16
C. The Evolving Court
That maturing judicial philosophy placed Black in the forefront of the
slow, case-by-case judicial resuscitation of the constitutional rights of the
black minority-fair trials, education, suffrage-a process duly noted and
commended in An American Dilemma. Myrdal, however, also indicated
that these efforts would be peripheral until the court laid the axe to the
root by reversing the judicial veto which its Civil Rights7 decision of 1883
had laid on Congressional legislation in the area of public accommodation.
Curiously, however, for all the attention the book gave segregation legisla-
tion, it omitted any mention whatsoever of that legislation's constitutional
underpinning-the 1896 decision of the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Fergu-
son.'8 It was there, over the spirited, sole dissent of the first Justice Harlan
("Our Constitution is color blind...*"),' that the Court upheld a Louisiana
statute requiring all railroads carrying passengers in that state to provide
equal but separate cars for the white and colored races.
The issue of separate-but-equal went back at least to 1849 when
Roberts v. City of Boston 0 held that a legal command for equality could
be squared with a legal command of enforced separation. Although Roberts
had no constitutional force in suggesting the content and meaning of the
14th amendment, its spirit was evident in the amendment's very origin. For
the 39th Congress, which had framed the amendment, also had segregated
galleries. (Vhy is [it] that [you have] separate places for the races even
in your own Chambers?" Maryland's Senator Reverdy Johnson asked his
colleagues. 'WVhy are they not put together?") 21 But Congress did not put
the races together, either in its galleries or in the educational institutions
under its direct jurisdiction. Particularly its action in continuing a segre-
gated school system in the District of Columbia seemed decisive to the
Court that decided Plessy v. Ferguson; the Court did not so much approve
the Louisiana segregation statute, but instead confessed an inability to say
16. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 -LuAv. L. R-Ev.
673, 679 (1963).
17. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). They declared the first two sec-
tions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional as applied to the states.
The Act bad made it unlawful to discriminate based on race or color in public
places. The Court ruled Congress did not have the authority to pass such a law.
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. Id. at 559.
20. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
21. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 776 (1866); See also C. FAInMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1868 433 (1971).
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that enforced segregation on a railroad train was "unreasonable or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia....22
Yet, the true constitutional infirmity of separate-but-equal may have
been that the 39th Congress had ordained the impossible. Myrdal insisted
that segregation could work economically only by systematic deprivation of
the weaker group because the duplication required for true equality would
be economically ruinous. Certainly the cumulative evidence of the end
product bore out his words. "The great difference in the equality of service
for the two groups in the segregated set-ups of transportation and educa-
tion is merely the most obvious example of how segregation is an excuse
for discrimination."23 But this truth had a double edge. The accomplishment
of the long-run strategy of bringing down the spirit of Plessy v. Ferguson
depended tactically on a Draconic insistence on its letter. In the tactic, as
Myrdal noted, lay the reforming group's broadest common ground, most
obvious legal appeal, and mode of exposing the inherent contradiction of
the formula.
At the beginning of the 1950's a trio of cases involving "the segregated
set-ups of transportation and education" afforded a spectacularly triumphant
application of both the tactic and the strategy. Tactically, the demand for
absolute equality was repeated; strategically, that demand was expanded
beyond quantitative to qualitative parity. In McLaurin v. Regents,24 a black
graduate student at the University of Oklahoma was accorded the use of
the same classrooms, library, and cafeteria used by white students, but was
confined to placarded ("Reserved for Colored") desks and tables. The
Supreme Court, holding the separation unconstitutional, found that this was
not an equal educational opportunity because it denied some of the intangi-
ble benefits of education that derive from association with fellow students. 25
Matching this insistence on the "intangibles" of full parity-an essentially
20th century insight-the Court in Henderson v. United States28 struck
down as an impermissible burden on national commerce (under the Inter-
state Commerce Act) 27 the designation by the Southern Railroad of a
separate, curtained table for Negroes in its dining cars, the unavailability
of which had caused the petitioner to go hungry on a trip from Washington
to Birmingham. In Sweatt v. Painter25 disparity was exposed by the mere
comparison of a concededly separate and hastily established law school at
the black Texas State University with the prestigious white counterpart of
the University of Texas. More importantly, in Sweatt the Court's Plessy v.
Ferguson measure became calibrated, not only to the measures of faculty,
22. 163 U.S. at 551.
28. MYnDAL at 515.
24. 889 U.S. 687 (1950).
25. Id. at 641.
26. 889 U.S. 816 (1950).
27. 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1) (1970).
28. 889 U.S. 629 (1950).
[Vol. 39
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degrees, library, and law review, but also by "qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school
.... reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni... "29
Under the field marshallship of Thurgood Marshall and the Howard
Law faculty, the petitioners in Sweatt had indicated the ultimate overthrow
of the quantitative by the qualitative in suggesting Pessy be re-examined
on the basis of the perceptions of contemporary culture. The eventual result
of this probe was, of course, obvious-that the psychological effect of
segregation on the segregated necessarily flawed the accommodation or
service involved and hence prevented equality of use and enjoyment.
Judicial response to these unanswered nuances of the trilogy-partic-
ularly, the constitutional consequences of the psychological reaction of the
segregated minority and how that reaction might be ascertained-was not
so much denied as deferred. The question was unavoidably posed in a
quintet of new controversies-from Kansas,30 South Carolina,8 1 Virginia,32
Delaware33 and the District of Columbia 4-moving inexorably up the
judicial ladder. Moreover, the challenge was asserted, not to graduate or
professional training, but to elementary education itself. It thereby presented
the greatest potential in both hazard and hope. On one hand, the public
temper which saw no harm in veiling the face of a fellow passenger in a
diner (whatever his reaction might be) could hardly be expected to endorse
the prolonged, compulsory and intimate association of small children. Yet
balanced against this attitude was the American vision that saw education
as the most fundamental transformation of all and which, appropriately
applied, could sweep away all other discriminations before it.
D. The Hazards of History
The Supreme Court had not been immune from the burning national
issue. It had been cropping up in the Court's own institutional life in one
way or another over the past decade and a half. In 1939, because of
segregated seating arrangements, what was to have been a private recital
of Marian Anderson in Constitution Hall became a public concert at
Lincoln Memorial wherein invitations to the Supreme Court produced one
29. Id. at 634.
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd, 349
U.S. 294 (1952). Due to procedural happenstance, the case of Linda Brown, the
student petitioner in the Kansas controversy, eventually led the four others, and
thereby stylistically symbolized the entire segregation issue.
31. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), rev'd 342 U.S. 350(1952).
82. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd,
849 U.S. 294 (1955).
33. Belton v. Gebhart, 82 Del. Ch. 848, 87 A.2d 862, aff'd, 91 A.2d 137
(1952), aff'd, 849 U.S. 294 (1955).
84. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari before judgment.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 847 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
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acceptance. In 1947, a household controversy-whether the black Supreme
Court messengers should attend the law clerks' and secretaries' Christmas
party-took almost an hour's debate at the weekly judicial conference
before being settled by an affirmative 6-2 vote. 5 In 1950, the stark constitu-
tional issue was presented without any pretense of Plessy v. Ferguson
trappings when Glen Taylor, the Progressive vice-presidential candidate,
unsuccessfully sought review of his Birmingham conviction for using the
colored instead of the white door to enter a church 6 ("There's not enough
room in town for Bull and the Commies.")3 7 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
The Anderson concert, the Christmas party controversy, and the Taylor
case had all occurred prior to Warren's accession to the Court, and accord-
ingly shed no light on where he might stand on the basic issue. Indeed, the
very speculation as to where he might stand underscored the haphazard-
ness of the constitutional process. A number of other men had been
mentioned for appointment as Chief Justice following the death of Fred
Vinson-John Foster Dulles, John J. McCloy, Robert A. Taft-any of whose
views might have entailed a different sequence of events. And certainly
that sequence of events might have been decidedly different, for example,
had James F. Byrnes not broken with Harry Truman, but instead sought and
obtained the Chief Justiceship on the death of Harlan Stone in 1946.38
Earl Warrens record as governor of California-innovative, activist,
progressive-had already been written. Yet there was also a thread running
through that record that afforded food for thought. Foremost was his
vigorous advocacy of the Nisei relocations before the fact and his vigorous
defense of that action afterward. More recently, there had been his firm
35. See Ulmer, Bricolage and Assorted Thoughts on Working in the Papers
of Supreme Court Justices, 35 J. OF POL. 286, 307 nn.58 & 54 (1973). The
demand to include the black messengers had been made by the law clerks, and
the secretaries withdrew from the planning. Possibly the incident represents one
of the first instances of "Ombudsmen from the elite law schools [joining] forces
with the Negro and white lower classes.. ." Riesman, In Memory of Harold W.
Solomon: Comments on Southern California's Flyer in Legal Education, 41
S. CAL. L. REV. 506, 512 n.6 (1968). It is interesting, in view of the comment of
one of the Justices at the conference ("[i]f ... we are going to be fair about
this business we know damn well that our hostesses, our wives don't have our
servants, and our messengers, as guests at parties." Ulmer, supra at 308 n.54),
that Justice Black's black messenger and cook were honored guests at the 'White
House reception honoring the thirtieth anniversary of his appointment to the
Court. LADY Bumu JonsoN, WHrrE HousE DLARY 513 (1967).
36. Taylor v. Birmingham, 35 Ala. App. 183, 45 So. 2d 53, cert. denied,
253 Ala. 369, 45 So. 2d 60, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 832 (1950).
37. K. ScwmroT, HENRY A. WALr.LcE: Q'ixoTic CRusADE 1948 79 (1960),
quoting Birmingham Police Commissioner Theophilus Eugene ("Bull") Connor.
38. Byrnes s attitude in 1953 was still relevant to the great issue at hand.
As incumbent governor of South Carolina he was desperately striving to make
his school system equal as well as separate. But he was threatening to abolish it
entirely if the separation could not be maintained. However, there are indications
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stand for loyalty oaths for the University of California faculty, a matter
which reportedly had been decisive in President Eisenhower's choice. In
fact, just some months before appointment and while Warren was still
being mentioned as a possible Republican nominee for the Presidency, an
article in the The New Republic looked at the record with considerable
apprehension. In addition to the Nisei relocations and the loyalty oaths, the
author found other disquieting items-opposition to both a parole for Tom
Mooney 9 and a California court appointment for Max Radin,40 an asserted
advocacy of migrant farm worker disenfranchisement but of agricultural
super-representation otherwise, and less-than-successful efforts to secure
fair employment legislation.' The interrogative caption of the article summed
it all up: "How Liberal Is Warren?" 41
E. The Limits of Politics
Relevant as that question was in a political context, it took on a
special significance in a judicial one. In grappling with its foremost dilemma
the American political process seemed to have reached the limit of its
effectiveness. Notwithstanding the triumphalist prose of The New Republic
hailing the 1950 trilogy of Sweatt-McLaurin-Henderson as "Jim Crow in
Handcuffs,"42 the more obvious fact seemed to be that the swart bird had
but lost some tailfeathers. To be sure an occassional black passenger might
dine in dignity; nonetheless, the appropriate counterpart of Henderson
might be glimpsed in the Freedom Train episodes of just a short time
before. Here the issue was not dining but something more fundamental, and
the recurrent controversies over whether segregation would be imposed on
lines of citizens waiting to view the organic documents of American
liberty provoked a bitter poem:
Can a coal-black man drive the Freedom Train?
Or am I just a porter on the Freedom Train?43
The political process had not failed for want of effort. As early as 1946
Truman had taken a firm stand for equal employment opportunity. But
despite an upset electoral victory two years later on a platform that included
a strong civil rights plank, despite an eloquent and landmark remonstrance
against "imposing a caste system on a minority group"4 4 by a prestigious
89. Mooney was a labor organizer who had been sentenced to death for the
murder of ten persons dlled by a bomb in a parade in San Francisco in 1916.
Warren was California's Attorney General at the time. Mooney's sentence was
subsequently commuted to life. L. HuSTON, PATHWAY TO JUDGMENT: A STUnY
oF EaL WAd'XN 62-68 (1966).
40. Radin was a professor at the University of California Law School and
was appointed to the California Supreme Court in 1940. Said to be a distinguished
liberal and a man with a passion for justice, his confirmation was opposed by
Warren, and his name was subsequently withdrawn. L. KATCHER, EARL WArmmN:
A POLrncAL BIoGRAPn 155-56 (1967).
41. THE NEw REPUmic, June 28, 1952, at 1; See article id. at 11.
42. Id., June 12, 1950, at 5.
43. A memory from earlier days.
44. To Secure These Rights, reprinted in L. FmrmM.N, THE CiviL RiGHTs
READER 18 (1967).
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presidential commission, despite majorities in both houses of Congress, Harry
Truman's Fair Deal proposals all came to naught. Superficially, of course,
there were any number of things to be blamed, and those ranged from con-
gressional structure-seniority, the committee system, the Senate filibuster-
to the Truman administration's effort to restore party harmony after the
bitter 1948 campaign. Deep down, perhaps, there was another reason.
This reason, the most subtle corrosive of all, said Myrdal, was the vague
and optimistic assumption that in time things would somehow work them-
selves out. But all the evidence suggested that things were not working
themselves out, particulary in the area of congressional action, which Myrdal
saw as the indispensable element of change. The very abortiveness of legisla-
tive proceedings only underscored how legislative developments increasingly
lagged judicial ones. The mere reporting from a House committee to the
floor of a doomed anti-lynching bill-the very type Calvin Coolidge had
recommended at the beginning of Hugo Black's first Senate term-was
accounted a signal victory. Mere House passage of an anti-poll tax and fair
employment measure, both defeated by Senate filibuster, was accounted an
even greater triumph. By the time Harry Truman's second term was over,
Professor Edmund Cahn summed up reformist sentiment with the bleak
observation that the 'legislative process that had appeared so promising in
the middle forties seemed to have come to a definite and protracted halt."45
If anything, this observation understated the case. By the time of
Dwight Eisenhower's inauguration the process would have been better
described in terms of total cessation. Nor could much hope be seen in the
modest promises of the new President to do what he could to end segrega-
tion in the District of Columbia and throughout the federal government.
These promises contrasted strikingly with the soaring but unaccomplished
proposals of his predecessor, not only in their distrust of centralized power
but in their unambitious estimate of what might be done.
Within a few months of his inauguration the new President received
assistance in redeeming his pledge from a quarter which no one, not even
Gunnar Myrdal, had suggested as an apparatus of political and social
change. On the very day the Supreme Court decided to set Linda Brown's
case down for reargument it also ended forthwith theatre and restaurant
segregation in the nation's capitol. 46 The mode was resuscitation of an 1873
District of Columbia statute that most parties in interest thought had been
repealed long before. The swift and summary nature of the change-in the
sharpest contrast to congressional donothingism-and the prompt public
acquiesence suggested that Congress, not the Court, was out of touch with
the the dominant public mood.
A further indication of the merits of decisive action and the supportive
popular response was suggested by the progress of military desegregation,
initiated under a Truman executive order. Hence, even though the first
45. Tim NEw REPtUBLIC, June 23, 1952, at 13.
46. District of Columbia v. J.R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
(Vol. 39
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session of the new 83rd Congress came and went without substantial legisla-
tive action on America's foremost problem, and even though the Republicans
in power seemed doubly disposed to emulate the inaction of the Democrats,
as the Supreme Court approached the 1953-54 Term and its new Chief
Justice other signs of the times could be seen as justifying an editorial
headline in The New Republic: "Exit Softly, Jim Crow."47
II. BRowN v. BoAnn: Tras BEcoRD AND BEYOND
A. Brown I
Present and set down for argument at that term was Linda Brown's
case out of Topeka, Kansas. It had been there since June 7, 1952, when the
Court agreed to hear it in a deceptively colorless per curiam. 48 Some of that
deception fell away the following October when the first advance sheets
for the new term suggested the national dimensions of the issue and consol-
idation with counterpart South Carolina, Delaware, Virginia, and District of
Columbia litigation was ordered. 49 First argument was accordingly sched-
uled for December, and the Court's temper with respect to it was suggested
by another entry in the reports shortly before Thanksgiving-a tart judicial
inquiry of November 24, 1952, which observed that the Kansas Attorney
General had neither appealed nor filed a brief and asked if such inaction
was meant as a concession of the unconstitutionality of the state segregation
statute.50 Another element was added shortly after the election in the belated
appearance of the Department of Justice on behalf of the petitioners.
At last came the display of advocacy on December 9, 10, and 11, 1952,
wherein the highspot was the confrontation pitting the great John W. Davis,
still at the mastery of his powers at 79, and 44-year-old Thurgood Marshall
of the NAACP. But, although the encounter provided great advocacy, it
afforded little argument for the antagonists never seemed to be at issue.
The two lines of address resembled nothing quite so much as the 19th and
20th centuries passing each other on parallel but never-meeting planes. Davis
pleaded eloquently against moving the landmark which the fathers had set.
("Somewhere, sometime to every principle comes a moment of repose
where it has been so long often announced, so confidently relied upon,
so long continued, that it passes the limits of judicial discretion and dis-
turbance.") 51 Marshall, however, was not to be outdone in either eloquence
or pragmatism. ("[E]ven if [segregation] was necessary in 1895, it is not
necessary now because people have grown up and understand each other.") 52
47. TH NEw REPUBLIC, July 27, 1953, at 8.
48. Brown v. Board of Educ., 72 S. Ct 1070 (1952).
49. Brown v. Board of Educ., 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
50. Brown v. Board of Educ., 344 U.S. 141, 141-42 (1952).
51. MacKenzie, Thurgood Marshall, in 3 L. FRMDsMAN & F. ISRAELS, THE
JusTicEs OF THE UNITED STATES Su REnz COURT 8078 (1969).
52. Id. at 8072.
The Court fired question after question at Marshall. Justice Frank-
furter, in particular, challenged his sociology .... Is it "irrelevant' to
recognize that some states have "a vast congregation of Negro popula-
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Much the same void was exhibited in briefs. Here, as in oral argument,
a second thrust of the petitioners' case lay in an exhibit evaluating, in the
light of modem knowledge, the consequences of racial segregation signed by
32 sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and psychiatrists.
The 1952-53 Term closed without an answer to either thesis. Instead,
the cases were set down for reargument on a remarkable sequence of four
interlacing questions largely turning on cause rather than consequence:
(1) whether the 14th amendment had actually abolished segregation of its
own force, (2) whether the "intentions of the framers" contemplated some
future Court or Congress doing so, (3) whether such abolition was within
the ambit of the federal judicial power, and (4) if the latter development
were to be the case, whether such power might be best exercised (a) by
admitting petitioners forthwith to schools of their choices, (b) by reorganiza-
tion of school districts, (c) by the appointment of special masters to oversee
the cases, or (d) by returning the cases to "courts of first instance."53
The convoluted questions suggested a few answers. One was that the
issue might be around for a long time, and that the current opinion of the
Court was merely Brown I. More substantive was the implication that the
Court was willing to strip away almost a century of encrusted overlay and
re-examine the original understanding of the 14th amendment. Beyond this
was the real thrust. Justice Frankfurter, in a somewhat malaprop meta-
phorical reference to the array of questions, cautioned the Court not to
"tip the mitt"54 by looking in the opposite directions. The mitt had indeed
been tipped, however, as Thurgood Marshall's comment indicated: "A
nothin'-to-nothin' score.., means we win the ball game."55
Obviously, things were not quite that simple, for the historical quest for
the meaning of the 14th amendment might not produce a standoff score, or
as Marshall later put the hazard, the "golden gate" might well turn out to
be a "booby trap with a bomb in it."56 The difficulty was the questionable
capability of the Supreme Court of the 1950's, far more remote from the
39th Congress than the Plessy Court, to nonetheless more clearly perceive
that body's intention. Nevertheless, Marshall plunged into the terra incognita,
and where a year earlier he had brigaded the views of social scientists, he
now called upon historians. In fact, he held a veritable seminar on the
subject in New York in September, 1953 ("the smartest move I ever made in
tion and some don't?" . . . Asked by Justice Jackson what impact a
favorable ruling would have on the American Indians, he proudly
reported: "The trouble with the Indians is that they haven't had thejudgment or the wherewithal to bring lawsuits."
W. HABAJGH, LA YwE'S LAWYER 505 (1973).
53. Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
54. L. BA x, FELix F 'NKFitmTn 306 (1969), quoting from a note from
Felix Frankfurter to Fred Vinson, June 8, 1953, Frankfurter Papers.
55. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case in J. GaRRATY, QUARMELS THAT
HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 264 (1962).
56. Id. at 260.
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my life"), 57 wherein the muse of history became the queen of law. His new
"historical" brief ran to 235 pages. The South Carolina reply covered 90 with
145 more of appendix. The Department of Justice brief covered 188 with
twice that amount in its appendix. 58
B. Brown II
As had happened a year earlier, the Brown arguments were once more
postponed from October to December. The reason was not procedural con-
solidation, however, but the need for the new Chief of Justice to acquaint
himself with the massive and formidable briefs. Hence, it was almost a year
to the day when the encounter was resumed, and from 1:05 p.m. on
December 7 to 2:42 p.m. on December 9 a magistral burst of advocacy
-again featuring a Davis-Marshall exchange-reviewed the intentions of
the 39th Congress. This time another element constantly intruded: appre-
hension and concern with public response, acquiesence, and obedience.
The dominance of the latter issue, and the subordination of the former
was apparent when the new Chief Justice read the opinion of a unanimous
Court at 12:52 p.m. on May 17, 1954.59 If the intricately filigreed questions
of Brown I suggested Justice Frankfurter, Brown Il-lumbering, bearlike,
and overpowering-bore the stamp of Earl Warren. All the subtle argument
and scholarly research as to what the 39th Congress had on its mind was
dismissed with one word--"inconclusive" 6 ---and Thurgood Marshall had
his zero-to-zero ballgame with a scorer's note in the observation that the
Court could not "turn the clock back to 1868 when the 14th amendment was
adopted or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written."61
The discard of the past provided the key to the present. After a
discussion of the growing place of education in American life and govern-
ment as well as its impact on the democratic process, and, perhaps most
critical, of the traumatic psychological impact of segregation on the segre-
gated minority, the Chief Justice came to the key sentence in which he
distinguished (but did not overrule) Plessy from the current controversy:
"We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equar has no place."62
Given the categorically absolute tone of the decision ("We have now
announced that such segregation is a violation of equal protection of the
laws."),6 the real surprise was that it did not admit a single child to a single
57. Id.
58. See D. BERMAN, IT Is So ORDERED: THE SUPREME COURT RULES ON
SCHOOL SEGREGATION 83 n.8 (1966).
59. Brown v. Board of Educ., 847 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Id. at 489.
61. Id. at 492.
62. Id. at 495.
The sentence was the most famous of Brown II. There were some others.
Almost as celebrated was Footnote 11 (Id. at 494) which dealt with the
psychological consequences of segregation, which began by citing Dr. Kenneth
Clark's Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development and
closed with "see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)."
63. Id. at 495.
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school. Brown II called for a Brown III argument on the fourth of the
arabesqued questions, that concerning remedy, where enlightenment had
been requested the preceding year.
A separate companion opinion 64 was necessary to dispose of the District
of Columbia issue involving as it did national rather than state power.
It also involved the difficulty that the 5th amendment, on which the
Washington petitioner's appeal was pitched, unlike the 14th, contains no
reference to "equal protection of the laws". This meant that if relief were
to be forthcoming at all it was to be secured under the nebulous bonds of
"due process."
The difficulty did not detain the Chief Justice for a minute. Citing
among other authorities United States v. Korematsu, 65 which had validated
the relocation camp incarceration of almost one hundred thousand American
citizens and their relatives solely on the basis of race, the companion opinion
reached its conclusion on a manifest and common sense proposition: that if
the Constitution outlawed segregation in education by the states, it was
"unthinkable '60 that it imposed a lesser duty on the federal government.
The logic had an irony transcending Korematsu. A century earlier in Dred
Scott v. Sandford 7 another Chief Justice had used the same judicial
reasoning-the logic of unthinkability ("No one.., would think a moment
... .") 8-to use the selfsame words of the fifth amendment as a mode of
extending slavery throughout the American territories.
C. Brown III
The issue of remedy came on almost a year later and almost as an
anticlimax. Once more scheduled argument had to be deferred, this time
in consequence of the death of Justice Jackson in early October of 1954 and
the subsequent Senate delay-in a sense, the first fruits of resistance to
Brown-until the following March in confirming the second Justice Harlan
as his successor. But on May 31, 1955, Chief Justice Warren once more
spoke for a unanimous bench in Brown 11169 and sent the cases back to the
lower courts with a phrase that would be long remembered: that racial
segregation in the public schools must be ended, not necessarily overnight,
but "with all deliberate speed."70
The phrase itself became almost as much the subject for debate and
reflection as the key decision, for notwithstanding the Chief Justice's brave
rhetoric that "constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement," 71 the plain fact was that constitutional principles
64. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
65. 328 U.S. 214 (1944).
66. Bolling v. Sharpe, 847 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
67. 61 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856).
68. Id. at 40.
69. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
70. Id. at 301.
71. Id. at 300.
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were being allowed to yield precisely because of that reason. At the time,
however, the abstract outlawry of educational segregation provoked the
larger commentary, or perhaps noncommentary, of which President Eisen-
hower's was the most conspicuous.
Other response was neither covert nor restrained and Warren's efforts
and particularly footnote 11 of Brown II drew a variety of fire. Professor
Edmond Cahn wrathfully denounced the citation of sociological data. ("I
would not have the constitutional rights of the Negroes-or of other Ameri-
cans-rest on any such flimsy foundations as some of the scientific demon-
strations in these records.") 72 The Chief Justice of Florida was likewise
scandalized, albeit from an opposite point of view by the citation of "the
Scandinavian sociologist," Gunnar Myrdal. ("What he knew about constitu-
tional law we are not told nor have we been able to learn.")73
Nevertheless, the spring of 1954, the spring of Brown II, was a spring-
time of hope with a euphoria almost impossible to remember in the light
of subsequent events. Down in Atlanta at the NAACP convention, Channing
Tobias greeted the decision, not in the accents of victory, but of moderation,
and promised his organization would work for its mandate in a spirit of
"give and take."74 In Washington, Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana
asserted that white Southerners were 'law-abiding citizens and the Supreme
Court's decision is the law of our land."7 5 Felix Frankfurter captured some-
thing of the spirit of the spring of 1954 when he was able to write an
old friend:
Yes, the unanimity of the Court in the Segregation decisions rightly
gave the widest comfort. Particularly heartening is the predomi-
nantly moderate tone of the southern press and with a few con-
spicuous exceptions, even the southern public men are more sober
than I should have expected them to be. Maybe one of these days
the story will be known how it came to pass.70
D. Beyond the Record
Frankfurter made another observation in his letter, and it touched the
very heart of what had transpired in Brown: "One does not have to be a
soothsayer to know that the new Chief Justice is one person and his
predecessor another" 77 The passage cryptically summarized the sequence
of events which brought a divided Court to the unanimous opinion of
May 17, 1954.78
72. W. Muiumn & C. PnrcHTr, CouaTs, JuDGEs AND PoLrrIcs; AN INTno-
DUCTION TO THE JUmcrAL PRocEss 844 (1961).
78. Id. at 614.
74. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1954, at 1.
75. Id. at 81.
76. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to C.C. Burlingham, supra note 1.
77. Id.
78. To repeat: This article, and particularly the part which follows, is written
as a factual account. It is considerably less than that, but considerations of syn-
tactical economy have prompted me to substitute the foregoing caveat for an
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Just two short years earlier, on June 9, 1952, the Justices by a seven to
one margin voted to hear the case.79 Justice Jackson cast the negative vote;
Chief Justice Vinson's vote was not recorded. The real divisions, however,
,appeared at the conference of December 13, 1952, following the first round
of argument. Here a remarkably diverse quartet favoring reversal of Plessy
-Black, Douglas, Minton, and Burton-confronted a doubtful Chief Justice
Vinson and the varyingly doubtful Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark.
As significant as the fact of division was its character.
This doubt was epitomized by the Chief Justice's perplexity as to the
action of the 39th Congress in dealing with the public schools under its
jurisdiction. But Vinson also indicated that the Court might have to act if
Congress did not, and the just concluded election of the 83rd Congress in
the first Eisenhower landslide obviously heightened the chances of the latter
contingency coming to pass. At the moment he seemed to favor continuing
the euthanasia approach of the past wherein the Court hastened the demise
of Plessy by affirming its letter and denying its spirit.80
But there seemed another element present: an obviously increasing
concern over judicial legislation in the area of civil rights. The Chief
Justice's questioning of petitioner's counsel during oral argument had been
seen as less than sympathetic. More suggestive was his forthcoming dissent
from Barrows v. Jackson,"' the last official word on civil rights. There he
was to break what had been the Court's long unanimity and disagree with
the veto which Barrows placed on state court enforcement of suits by whites
against whites for sales of real estate to blacks in violation of racially
restrictive covenants.
E. The Duel Rejoined
Something of the same apprehension beset Felix Frankfurter. The
historical intentions and the original understandings of the 39th Congress as
expressed in the 14th amendment had been on his mind a long, long time.
"For nearly 20 years," he wrote a colleague back in 1947, "I was at work
on what was to be as complete and as scholarly a book on the 14th Amend-
ment as I could make it."82 From that study he had concluded that the
states were under no constitutional ban insofar as legally imposed segrega-
tion was concerned. The Federal government and the District of Columbia,
however, were another thing again. Here he saw the far more obscure and
latitudinous due process clause of the 5th amendment as a readily available
source of judicial power.
unending string of qualifiers-"assertedly," "allegedly," "reportedly," et al.-which
would otherwise encumber the text. My principal source has been the Burton
diaries in the Library of Congress and particularly Professor S. Sidney Ulmers
publications therefrom.
79. Brown v. Board of Educ., 72 S. Ct. 1070 (1952).
80. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
81. 846 U.S. 249 (1953).
82. Memorandum to Hugo Black, Nov. 13, 1943, Frankfurter Papers.
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Almost predictably, Hugo Black disagreed. Black's antipathy toward
judicial resort to due process as a super-legislative veto authority had been
established as far back as his first Senate term. But that was not at issue;
what was in dispute was the meaning and content of the 14th amendment
vis-a-vis state power. Here Black had made his own independent study, best
exemplified in the lengthy appendix attached to his dissent in Adamson v.
California,8 but manifested also in one of the dissents at the beginning of
his judicial service.84 That study had been undertaken in the context of
Black's long-standing duel with Felix Frankfurter over whether the 14th
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights. It posed special complications
for the issue in Brown. The very Congressman Bingham whom Black had
hailed in his Adamson appendix as "the James Madison of the 14th Amend-
ment" 5 had insisted that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 be amended to
eliminate prohibition of state segregation laws. To be sure, the inference
was as long as it was broad, for the evidence also suggested that Bingham
felt this result should be effected by amendment rather than statute.
Black preferred to take his stand with the first Justice Harlan that
segregation as a constitutional issue was ruled essentially by the 13th, 14th
and 15th amendments ensemble, rather than by the legislative history of any
one. The consequence was simple: that slavery with all its incidents, conse-
quences, and secondary pathology-including separation by reason of color
-lay under the continuing ban of the organic law.
The specific letter of the 14th amendment was also available to support
his view and what was perhaps his line of argument at the December
conference, reconstructed from subsequent expression. Thirteen years after
Brown II, Justice Douglas gave one view of what that case decided-
that "notions of what constitutes equal treatment for the purposes of the
equal protection clause do change."86 It drew a bristling dissent from his
longtime coadjutor: 'I do not vote to hold segregation in the public schools
unconstitutional on any such theory. I thought when Brown was written
and I think now, that Mr. Justice Harlan was correct in 1896 when he
dissented from Plessy v. Ferguson'87 And still two years later in a television
program Black elaborated his defense of an unchanging equal protection
clause:
My view was, we had a simple question: does that give the colored
people of the nation equal protection of the law .... Well, I lived
in the South, practically until I came up here .... I didn't need
any philosophy about changing times to convince me that there was
a denial of equal protection of the laws.88
88. 882 U.S. 46, 92 (1947).
84. Connecticut Gen. v. Johnson, 803 U.S. 77 (1938).
85. 832 U.S. at 74 (1947).
86. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 388 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
87. Id. at 677 n.7.
88. Television Transcript, CBS Telecast, Mr. Justice Black and the Bill of
Rights, 12 (1968).
17
Dunne: Dunne: Justice Hugo Black
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Frankfurter, however, had no desire to take a stand with the first
Justice Harlan, and what Frankfurter had to say earlier in Adamson v.
California,"0 on the incorporation of the Bill of Bights in the 14th amend-
ment, was not without relevance to the decision he faced in Brown:
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
beginning of the present membership of the Court-a period of 70
years-the scope of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-
three judges. Of all those judges, only one, who may respectfully
be called an eccentric exception, ever indicated the Fourteenth
Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first eight Amend-
ments theretofore limiting only the Federal Government, and that
due process incorporated those eight Amendments as restrictions
on the powers of the States. Among those judges were not only
those who would have to be included among the greatest in the
history of the Court, but-it is especially relevant to note-they
included those whose services in the cause of human rights and the
spirit of freedom are the most conspicuous in our history ... Miller,
Davis, Bradley, Waite, Matthews, Gray, Fuller, Holmes, Brandeis,
Stone, and Cardozo .... 90
He might have added, vis-a-vis the current issue, Hughes, Stone, Murphy
and Rutledge. Still, by early 1953 Frankfurter had made the break with
the past, although the agony of his choice was suggested by a work of
superogation-having "one of the most dependable law clerks he ever had"
read "every word"91 in the old Congressional Globe relating to the formula-
tion of the 14th amendment.
In any event, with the advent of 1953 his thoughts turned from right
to remedy, and his writing skills appeared in the ceaseless drafting and
re-drafting of a memorandum to his fellow Justices concerning what form
the Court's forthcoming decree should take. This overt change of position,
together with that of Justice Tom Clark-who insisted that whatever be
done be done with a gentling hand but whose ultimate judicial position had
been forecast by his stand against residential segregation as Attorney Gen-
eral-reduced the previous five-man majority reluctant to overrule Plessy to
an unconvinced trio of Vinson, Reed, and Jackson.
Along this line, the arabesqued questions that came out of Brown I
were largely drawn from Frankfurter's views on the direction in which the
Court should proceed and his recommendation that the Court should conceal
that direction by looking in opposite directions. Concealment went only so
far, however, for Frankfurter had a characteristically tart response to
suggestions that the Court indicate that the questions had been framed at
the request of the Department of Justice:
1. We ought to assume full responsibility for the questions we put
89. 832 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (concurring opinion).
90. Id. at 62. See also Frankfurter's rollcall of his deceased predecessors in
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192 (1958).
91. Letter to Conference, Dec. 5, 1953, Frankfurter Papers.
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to counsel, and what is perhaps more important.
2. The objections which both parties will naturally have . . .
John Davis, et al., because they do not want any intimation that
the merits will go against them, and Thurgood Marshall because
he wants a decree on the merits unqualified-ought not to be
allowed to be resolved into resentment against the Government
for bringing up this matter in the first place....92
F. The Changing Cast
The second Brown conference was held December 12th, a year to the
day less one since the first meeting of the Court on the merits of the case.
The meeting mixed the old and the new. One new element was the position
of Justice Frankfurter, who four days earlier had circulated among the
Justices a memorandum which compressed the tour de force of his historical
,research on the origins of the 14th amendment into a brief phrase--"in a
word, inconclusivef'9 3 It was to give the Chief Justice a key term of his
Brown II effort.
Also completely new were the words and attitudes of the Chief Justice
of the United States, and these differed strikingly from those of his prede-
cessor. The historical difficulties that had beset Vinson moved Warren not
at all. Instead, almost at the opening, he tersely restated the Harlan-Black
concept that it did not take research but only a knowledge of the plain
meaning of plain words to know that segregation violated the 14th amend-
ment and the 13th and 15th as well. Insisting that the practice was based
on a presumption of racial inferiority and had no place today, whatever its
past may have been, Warren proposed that the only duty of the Supreme
Court was "to abolish [it] in a tolerant way 94 The statement also indicated
that the Warren style which had been developed in 11 years in state
government was to continue in the Chief Justiceship-innovative, policy-
making, advocative, persuasive.
Only two of the Justices present seemed disposed to dispute their new
Chief. Stanley Reed, conceding that the Constitution of Plessy and 1896
might not be the Constitution of today, denied Warren's assumption that
segregation necessarily rested on an assumption of racial inferiority and
suggested the arrangement might be justified as an application of the police
power of the state. A far harder opposition seemed to lie with Robert
Jackson, whose files contained a bristling memorandum ("A Random
Thought on the Segregation Cases") and whose disclosure some years later
would itself trigger a separate and independent controversy.95 At the time,
92. Memorandum to Justice Clark, June 4, 1958, Frankfurter Papers.
93. Memorandum to Conference, Jan. 13, 1954, Frankfurter Papers.
94. Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. oF PoL. 693 (1971).
95. The now Mr. Justice Rehnquist was a law clerk to Justice Jackson. It
was his nomination to the Supreme Court which was the subject of the controversy.
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however, its thrust illuminated some of the argument among members of
the Court:
I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position for
which I have been excoriated by my "liberal' colleagues, but I think
Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be affirmed. If the 14th
Amendment did not enact Spencer's Social Statics it just as surely
did not enact Myrdals American Dilemma.98
Yet, Jackson did not take this line of address at the conference. He did
much the same thing, however, in softer words, suggesting that he knew
no judicial way to reverse Plessy but that he was prepared to join-if so
labeled-a frankly political decision reaching this end. All through argument
before the Court his comments had indicated the issue was essentially one
for political resolution. ("I suppose that realistically the reason this case is
here is that action couldn't be obtained from Congress.") 97 His complete
response to that impasse was such that a quarter-century later a former law
clerk would say that "[t]o this day ... I am not exactly sure what Justice
Jackson's views were . s"98
The winning over of the minority became the Chief Justice's key
strategy, and he approached it with the same bland but hydraulic and
pervasive manner which had worked his will time and time again with a
recalcitrant legislature. Five days after the conference Justice Burton was
recording the Chiefs tactic-"to try [and] direct discussion of segregation
cases toward the decree-as probably was the best chance of unanimity in
that phase." 9 Here Burton put his finger on the critical element of any
reversal of Plessy: the indispensability of organic unity and the necessity
that the Court speak with a single voice.
III. DarArxs IFsoNNAE
A. The Orchestral Conductor
In a later commentary-written in the subsequent fallout of Brown
and therefore applicable a fortiori to the germinal litigation-Frankfurter
suggested the double necessity for judicial unanimity. One was negative-
to foreclose "any possible misunderstanding, especially by those fired with
a zeal to pervert, that there was any qualification to the responsibility for
every member of the Court for the Court's decision .... ."0 The other was
positive-to make "the transcending issue" not segregation but "respect for
96. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1971, at 1.
97. A. BI=xL, Thr Sutrux CoURT AND =n IDeA or PRocEss 7 (1970),
quoting from 22 U.S.L.W. 8158, 3161 (1953).
98. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1971, at 28, quoting Donald Cronson.
99. Ulmer, supra note 94, at 697.
100. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to C.C. Burlingham, Nov. 12, 1958, Frank-
furter Papers. Mr. Frankfurter was commenting on the Little Rock school case(Cooper v. Aaron, 858 U.S. 1 (1958)) but the statement is equally, if not more,
applicable to the Brown decisions.
[Vol. 39
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/10
1974] JUSTICE BLACK AND THE BROWN DECISION 21
law as determined so impressively by a unanimous Court in construing the
Constitution of the United States."10 1
The means of securing the impressive and unanimous determination
took the form of a double envelopment. The first fold was to align the
plurality who already agreed to Plessy's reversal on the mechanics of
reversal and hold them together. Concessions obviously had to come from
this revisionist quartet whose initial disposition was to effect the overthrow
out of hand. The second was to coax the others into the group. Here also
Frankfurter came to the fore. Well before the second conference of
December 12, 1953, he was helping shape the tactic of remedy via the
phrase, "with all deliberate speed." It was an ancient chancery line, one
which Holmes had used half a century before, 02 which Frankfurter himself
had used repeatedly and without attribution'03 and which he incorporated
in a secret memorandum to the Court ("[T]he typing was done under
conditions of strict security.").104 This was the phrase that was much
criticized and long regretted; at the time, however, it yielded two enormous
advantages, distinct but related. Primarily, it fitted the vague mood of hope
that the problems of race in America would somehow and in some way work
themselves out. Tactically, it later gave the Chief Justice the resource of flex-
ibility. It was a remedy of compromise, and in the short run, massed the
Court on a common front regarding the fundamental Constitutional issue.
In many ways, massing the Court involved the same delicate game of
feint, charm, and persuasion that Warren had played a thousand times in
Sacramento. On the Court, as in the legislature, each side held some trump
cards; in Brown, however, the potential dissenters had a bargaining position
out of all proportion to their numbers. Yet the Chief Justice was not without
some bargaining leverage of his own on this proposition, where the key
issue (as Frankfurter suggested) was the institutional character of the Court
itself and where the consequences of a divided decision could be equally
chilling when turned either way.
In any event, a unanimous opinion is the product of all participants,
and the role of the Chief Justice was essentially that of orchestral inter-
mediary. Perhaps some members of the Court were more open to his
advocacy than others, as for example, Justice Reed, whose concession on
a changing Constitution had stipulated away half the intellectual opposition
and whose heart had already demonstrated it was in the right place.
Notwithstanding a rural Kentucky background, it was Reed who wrote the
landmark opinions ending the color bar in party primaries o5 and integrating
101. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to C.C. Burlingham, Nov. 12, 1958, Frank-
furter Papers.
102. Virginia v. West Virginia, 222 U.S. 17, 20 (1911).
103. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 826 U.S. 120, 182 (1945); Addi-
son v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 822 U.S. 607, 619 (1944); Chrysler Corp.
v. United States, 816 U.S. 556, 568 (1942) (dissent).
104. Memorandum to the Court, Jan. 15, 1954.
105. Smith v. Allright, 821 U.S. 649 (1944).
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common passenger carriers in interstate commerce.106
Throughout the spring of 1954 the Chief Justice backed and filled with
the issue of remedy as his major ploy, and by May 8, 1954, Associate Justice
Burton's praise of the draft effort to date ("a magnificent job that may win
a unanimous court") 10 7 suggested the end of the trail was in sight. On
May 12 the close was even nearer at hand ("It looks like a unanimous
opinion"),108 The entry at the conference of May 15 recorded the draft
being "finally approved" and therewith Warren's triumph.
But he had help.
B. The Last Federalist
"[W]hen the inner history of [the Brown] case is known," Professor
Bickel noted, "we may find that [Justice Frankfurter] was a moving force
in its decision." 0 9 Frankfurter's contributions lay at several levels. One may
have been a role as devil's advocate, masking the strong feelings he obviously
had ("As one who, for years before coming on the Court, was a member of
the legal committee of the NAACP") 01 and testing the arguments put
forward,' But most conspicuous and, in retrospect, most ironic, was the
suggestion of "with all deliberate speed." At the time it seemed the tactic of
consensus when consensus was indispensible. Years later, Justice Black
looked back with regret:
[I] t seems to me that it probably delayed the process of outlawing
segration. It seems to me, probably, with all deference to the opin-
ion and my brethren, all of them, that it would have been better-
maybe-I don't say positively-not to have had that sentence.1 12
Ironically enough, Felix Frankfurter also agreed, ambiguously asserting
some years later that the sentence "was used without credit [against my
protest] in the segregation opinion."" 3
In truth, Frankfurter's contribution in the area of phrasemaking did not
lie in the increasingly controverted sentence concerning speed but in the
single word "inconclusive" with which he summed up the legislative history
of the 14th amendment and which was incorporated in a key sentence in
the Brown II opinion. His private opinion of that history was even less
complimentary. ("[H]ow anyone could have gone through the debates in
Congress on the subject of the 14th amendment and have respect for the
intellectual clarity of hardly anyone in that debate beats me.") 1 4 But the
106. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
107. Ulmer, supra note 94, at 698.
108. Id. at 699.
109. A. BICKEL, supra note 97, at 33.
110. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Walter Lippmann, Aug. 8, 1957, Frank-
furter Papers.
111. I am indebted for this and other insights to Mr. Richard Icluger.
112. Black TV Transcript, supra note 88, at 14.
118. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Mark DeWolfe Howe, May 5, 1958,
Frankfurter Papers.
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important thing was that he had laid his towering reputation for integrity
("I feel about accuracy the way Queen Victoria felt about chastity")" 5 on
the line in attesting that the legislative history was indeed inconclusive.
Even after Frankfurter had settled the question of legislative intent the
conclusion did not come easy to him. He was indeed the last Federalist,
scrupulously concerned with keeping the ancient balance the Fathers had
set between central power and local authority, and beyond that, with
keeping the judicial power within its appointed limits.
My starting point is . . .the democratic faith . . . the right of a
democracy to make mistakes and correct its errors by the organs
that reflect the popular will-which regards the Court as a qualifi-
cation of the democratic principle and desires to restrict the play of
this undemocratic feature to its narrowest limits.11 6
Yet, despite this starting point he did come over. Why? Perhaps it was the
passage from Holmes he was so fond of quoting:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed." 7
Frankfurter may have made one other contribution to the unanimity
of Brown in the evolving position of Justice Jackson.
C. The Final Participant
On March 30, 1954, Justice Robert Jackson suffered a heart attack and
from that day until the reading of the Brown II opinion on May 17th was
confined to the hospital. For that reading he came directly to the bench
from his hospital bed to add his physical presence to the display of
institutional solidarity. Five months later he was dead. The following year
his Godkin Lectures were published posthumously by the Harvard Univer-
sity Press.118 If the controverted memorandum" 9 were in fact an index of
Jackson's views during the pendency of Brown, then a remarkable passage
in the lecture could have been framed, in vitro at least, as a dissenting
opinion in Brown 1I:
A cult of libertarian judicial activists... appears to believe that the
Court can find in a 4,000-word eighteenth-century document or its
nineteenth-century Amendments, or can plausibly supply, some
clear bulwark against all dangers and evils that today beset us
115. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Grenville Clark, Dec. 16, 1987, Frank-
furter Papers.
116. Memorandum to Hugo Black, Nov. 18, 1948, Frankfurter Papers.
117. 0. HOLMES, Tam COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
118. R. JAcKSON, TiyE Suprixv'm COURT IN 'mw AminCAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ESNMENT (1955).
119. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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internally. This assumes that the Court will be the dominant factor
in shaping the constitutional practice of the future and can and
will maintain, not only equality with the elective branches, but a
large measure of supremacy and control over them .... But it
seems to me a doctrine wholly incompatible with faith in democ-
racy, and in so far as it encourages a belief that the judges may be
left to correct the result of public indifference to issues of liberty
in choosing Presidents, Senators, and Representatives, it is a
vicious teaching.1 20
What aborted the dissent, if dissent it was, and won Jackson over?
Surely not the friendly persuasion of the Chief Justice who occupied the
office for which Jackson had been twice passed over. Jackson did have one
close friend on the bench in Frankfurter-the only one, if a book so
scurrilous that Frankfurter wanted to sue for libel is to be believed.121 But
Jackson was always his own man, whatever the counsel of friends, and his
final decision was very much of his own making. Perhaps in those months
in the hospital, overshadowed with the intimidations of mortality, another
and wholly different consideration was both critical and decisive-the
memories of Nuremberg where he had served as a prosecutor of the Nazi
war criminals and had seen, as few men have, the ultimate pathology of
race and the Caliban state.
D. The Senior Associate
Despite-or perhaps because of-the fact he was the only member of
the Court from the deep South, Black was in the forefront of the revisionist
bloc. He had acquired some credentials much earlier when he was the
only member of the Supreme Court to accept Secretary Ickes's invitation
and attend the Marian Anderson concert at Lincoln Memorial. ("Only ten
Senators attended," diaried Ickes, "and only one Justice of the Supreme
Court-Black-who was a former member of the Ku Klux Klan.")' 22 More
recently, he and Douglas had been the only members of the Court willing
to hear the head-on and unadorned confrontation to segregation presented
by the Taylor 23 case of 1950.
A reference to the latter episode and a measure of the progress of ideas
came when the Southern Conference for Human Welfare honored Black
a second time. The second event, some six years after the first, occurred a
week before the death of Franklin Roosevelt in 1945. This time there was
no imposition of segregation laws but instead a glittering and fully integrated
120. R. JAcKsO N, supra note 118, at 57, 58.
121. R. ALLEN & W. SmNNoN, THE TnumAN MERRY-Co-RouND (1950). "1
am greatly tempted to sue both the publishers and the authors for libel." Memo-
randum from Felix Frankfurter to Hugo Black, Sept. 30, 1950, Frankfurter Papers.
122. 2 H. IcKEs, THE SEcrxT DAftY OF HAROLD L. Icsn~ 615 (1954).
123. Taylor v. Biifmingham, 85 Ala. App. 183, 45 So. 2d 53, cert. denied,
258 Ala. 369, 45 So. 2d 60, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 882 (1950).
[Vol. 39
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gathering at Washington's new Statler Hotel. At the meeting, Charles
Houston, general counsel of the NAACP, recalled the Anderson event:
"After the concert, Negroes sought Mr. Justice Black's autograph more than
any other person except Miss Anderson herself. People have an uncanny
instinct for recognizing their friends."124
Black was hailed that night by the future Chief Justice Vinson as "an
unmistakably Southern but genuinely national stateman,"125 and a passage
in Black's reply forecast both his Brown concurrence and the consequent
tension between the two loyalties ("The conditions which created fascism
abroad must not be allowed to exist here-the placing of some groups in a
preferred class of citizenship at the expense of other groups.")1 28 Perhaps
the oblique phrase was especially applicable to Houston, whose Supreme
Court appearances involved a lunch at Union Station-the only nearby
place he could eat-and to whom the dining facilities in Washington, from
the drug store lunch counters to the Statler itself, remained as closed after
the festive evening as they were before.
In any event, it was precisely Black's Alabama origins that give his
concurrence in Brown, and through it the decision itself, an ultimate
credibility. "How wonderful the unanimity of the Court," wrote the
venerable C.C. Burlingham, dean of the American bar. "Black's concurrence
is marvelous. He is as good a Southern Democrat as any of the Governors
and Senators." 27
But goodness as a Southern Democrat did not carry with it freedom
from the price exacted, and some years later Chief Justice Warren suggested
what that price was when he declined praise for the decision and insisted,
instead, that it go to the Southern Justices-Reed of Kentucky, Clark of
Texas, and Black, who had to go home thereafter. In Black's case there
was a degree of rhetorical license, for Black did not go home, at least
for a long time to come. Ironically, his southward trip which caused him
to miss the historic December, 1953, conference on Brown II was the last
public journey he was to take to his native state for over a decade. He
did not need critical senatorial oratory to know that there would be "a more
or less hostile attitude on the part of many people, partially because of a
feeling that I have participated in opinions which many people thought
were bad for Alabama and the South."128
The price was exacted vicariously, however, and it was that much
harder to suffer. "Hugo, Jr., and Graham are at Birmingham, no children
yet," the Justice had written a few years before Brown I1. "Hugo is doing
124. J. FnANx, MR. JUSTICE BLAcK: Tim MAN AND His OPInIONS 138 (1949).
125. Birmingham News, Apr. 4, 1945 at-.
126. Id.
127. Letter from C.C. Burlingham to Felix Frankfurter, May 18, 1954, Frank-
furter Papers.
128. Letter from Hugo Black to Jerome Cooper, Nov. 8, 1961, in Cooper,
Mr. Justice Black; Footnote to a Great Case 24 ALA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1971).
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well in the practice and loves it." 29 The son and namesake, educated in
Alabama and practicing law in his parent's home town, obviously had the
most promising of political futures in a state where the Bankhead dynasty
was proof that family names would be taken seriously. All that passed with
the Brown decision.
It all had been forecast some two decades before when Walter White,
Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, wrote of the assurances ("[H]e hoped that he would be
able to measure up to what I and others of his friends expected of him.") 130
just tendered by the senior Senator from Alabama who was about to become
the junior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: "Somehow or other,
I feel quite confident that he is going to do so. I do hope we won't be
fooled by him." 31-
Nor were they.
129. Letter from Hugo Black to Hazel Black Davis, Mar. 14, 1952, in
H. DAvis, UNCLE HuGo: AN INTmnTE PoRTnArr oF MR. JusncE BLACK (1965).
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